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Abstract  
 
This paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on financial 
performance of the listed firms in Bangladesh. Agency theory suggests that better 
corporate governance reduces expropriation costs, which in turn enhances investors’ 
confidence in the firm’s future cash flow and growth prospects, leading to higher firm 
valuation. Likewise, a decrease in private benefits is likely to cause an improved 
operating performance. This paper uses a questionnaire survey-based corporate 
governance index (CGI), comprising of the three dimensions - shareholder rights, 
independence and responsibilities of the board and management, and financial reporting 
and disclosures. The study results partly confirm the prediction of the agency theory, with 
a statistically significant positive relationship between a firm’s corporate governance 
quality and its valuation, even though the relationship between firm level corporate 
governance and operating performance seems inconclusive.  
 
Key words - corporate governance index, agency theory, financial performance, 
Bangladesh. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance (CG) has become a critical consideration for the developed as well 
as developing economies to maintain sustainable economic and business sector 
development. Bangladesh, like many other developing economies, has been experiencing 
broad-based corporate governance reform initiatives since 2001 under the guidance and 
sponsorships of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. Much of these reform 
initiatives are based on the agency theory-based Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance (see Reed, 2002). The IFIs have been pursuing developing economies to use 
this model as the main framework for corporate governance reform. This brings a number 
of related questions: Do these market-based arguments and prescriptions of a developed 
economy hold true for a developing economy? Is the relationship between firm-specific 
CG and firm performance consistent with the prediction of the agency theory? How do 
firm-specific CG practices explain financial performance of a firm?  
 
To answer these questions, it is imperative to investigate the influence of firm-specific 
CG practices on the performance of a firm in a developing economy. In order to 
understand the dynamics of CG-performance relationship of a firm, it is also important to 
do a country-specific study (as opposed to cross-country study), since each country is 
different in terms of its legal, regulatory and market institutions.   
    
Whilst available literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Chhaochharia 
and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et al., 2011; Morey et al., 2009) supports the prediction of 
the agency theory in relation to a positive association between firm-level corporate 
governance rating and firm valuation, these are cross-country analyses are based on either 
developed and/or emerging markets. A number of recent country-specific studies also 
find corporate governance quality having a positive influence on firm valuation in Korea 
(Black et al., 2006), India (Balasubramanian et al. 2010), Brazil (Braga-Alves and 
Shastri, 2011), and Mexico (Price et al., 2011). However, most of these studies do not 
address the influence of corporate governance on a firm’s operating performance. Two 
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notable cross-country studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) 
find positive relationship between CG index and firm profitability, whereas Gompers et 
al., (2003) find mixed evidence on this issue1. Interestingly, three country-specific studies 
(e.g., Black et al., 2006; Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011; Price et al., 2011) do not find 
any effect of firm-level governance index on a firm’s operating performance in emerging 
economies such as Korea, Brazil and Mexico. This inconclusive evidence seems 
surprising from a theoretical point of view as the agency theory suggests a positive 
influence of CG on both firm valuation and operating performance.  
 
In this respect, this paper examines whether firm-level corporate governance has an 
influence on a firm’s valuation and profitability within a single jurisdiction of a 
developing economy such as Bangladesh. To the best of our knowledge no study focuses 
on the linkage between corporate governance quality and firm performance in 
Bangladesh. This study is based on 140 listed financial and non-financial firms in 
Bangladesh.       
 
The prime motivation of this study is to contribute to the existing agency theory-based 
literature on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
from the perspective of an emerging economy such as Bangladesh, where the capital 
market and the corporate sector are very weak, and the financial system is predominantly 
bank-based. Bangladesh represents an interesting case for this study due to the ongoing 
reform initiatives in the financial sector of this country. However, little is known about 
the effect of financial sector reform on capital market development in terms of relatively 
better corporate governance practices and better investors’ confidence. This study is 
likely to have important policy implications in relation to the impact of corporate 
governance reform that was undertaken to strengthen the capacity building of the capital 
market.  
 
                                                 
1 Gompers et al., (2003) find that governance index is positively related to average net profit margin, but no 
relationship is found between governance index and return on equity.  
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Another important motivation of this study is to measure overall corporate governance 
practices of a firm rather than individual governance components. This is because firm-
level corporate governance is a complex part of corporate strategy, which is 
simultaneously determined by several factors including the rights of the shareholders, 
independence and responsibilities of the board and management, and disclosures and 
transparency. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is used to examine the effect 
of a firm’s overall governance quality measured through a corporate governance index 
(CGI).  
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the available 
literature and section 3 outlines the research question and empirical model. Section 4 
presents the empirical analysis, and section 5 analyses the study results. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The empirical evidence of the influence of individual corporate governance mechanisms 
on financial performance is highly inconclusive. Whilst several studies (e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, henceforth LLSV, 2002) find a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance, and thus 
support the prediction of the agency theory, others (e.g., Hovey et al., 2003) find 
inconsistent or contrasting evidence in this regard. Among others, Gugler et al., (2008) 
support the notion of the agency theory with respect to a positive influence of insider 
ownership and firm performance. They also find institutional ownership having a positive 
effect on performance in the USA, although the shareholding of financial institutions is 
found to have a negative effect on firm performance in other Anglo-Saxon countries and 
in Europe. Mitton (2002) finds institutional and outside ownership concentration being 
positively associated with financial performance in East Asian economies.    
 
A related literature (e.g., LLSV, 2002) supports the prediction of the agency theory in 
relation to a positive influence of investors’ legal protection on financial performance. 
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Mitton (2002) finds disclosure quality having a positive influence on firm performance. 
Contrary to claims in the literature, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find board independence 
being negatively correlated with operating performance. Other studies (e.g., Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Bennedsen et al., 2008) also find inconsistent evidence with regard to 
the relationship between different board and management issues (e.g., board size, board 
interlocks and CEO duality) and financial performance.   
 
A number of recent studies (e.g., Dahya et al., 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2010) 
develop country-level corporate governance index to address various potential agency 
conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholders and managers, 
between shareholders and bondholders, and between majority and minority shareholders. 
Other studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008; Morey et al., 2009) use a firm-level governance index comprising a number of 
elements of individual governance components. These studies support the prediction of 
the agency theory with reference to a positive influence of corporate governance on both 
the valuation and operating performance of a firm2. Braga-Alves and Shastri (2011) also 
find that voluntary reform in CG practices (measured through firm-specific corporate 
governance indices) is positively related with firm valuation in Brazil, where both legal 
environment and investors’ protection are poor. This observation is consistent with the 
findings of other country-specific studies (Black et al. 2006; Balasubramanian et al. 
2011; Price et al., 2011) that examine the effect of overall governance quality on firm 
valuation in emerging economies such as Korea, India and Mexico. Claessens (2003) 
argues that better corporate governance can enhance firm value as well as operating 
performance, through more efficient management, better allocation of assets, better 
stakeholder management and other improved mechanisms. 
 
3. Hypothesis and model 
 
                                                 
2 Contrary to claims in the literature, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that governance measures to be 
uncorrelated with future stock market performance. 
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This paper is complementary to a growing body of literature that examines the 
relationship between firm-level corporate governance and financial performance. More 
specifically, it addresses the following hypothesis: 
 
      H1. Corporate governance quality is positively associated with firm valuation and 
operating performance.  
 
This paper follows, among others, Black et al., (2006) in incorporating a corporate 
governance index (CGI) as an important determinant of a firm’s valuation and operating 
performance. Moreover, controlling shareholders’ ownership is taken as an additional 
governance variable that has not been incorporated into the CGI. It uses two widely-used 
market-based firm valuation measures as the dependent variables, namely the Tobin’s Q 
and Market-to-Book ratio (denoted as MKT2BK), that have been used in several studies 
(e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006; LLSV, 2002). Tobin’s Q is calculated 
as the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets, where market value of 
assets is the total debt plus market capitalization. Market-to-Book is the ratio of market 
capitalization to shareholders’ equity, where shareholders’ equity (or net worth) is the 
difference between the firm’s total assets and total debt. 
 
This study also follows, among others, Gompers et al., (2003) and Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002) in using three accounting-based profitability measures: return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net profit margin (NPM) as dependent variables. 
ROA is the ratio of net income (i.e., earnings after interests and taxes) to the book value 
of assets, and ROE is measured as the ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity. NPM is 
computed as the ratio of net income to total sales. The use of alternative valuation and 
profitability measures is intended to examine the relative degree of influence of a firm’s 
corporate governance standard.  
 
3.1. The regression model 
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In order to assess the effect of corporate governance on firm performance, the following 
model is estimated: 
 
Firm performance () =  + 1 (CGI) + 2 (Controlling Ownership) + 3 (Firm Age) + 
4 (Growth) + 5 (Leverage) + 6 (Investment) + 7 (Intangible 
Assets) + 8 (Firm Size) + 9 (Industry Dummies) + …………… (1) 
 
This model incorporates two valuation measures (e.g., Tobin’s Q and the Market-to-Book 
ratio) and three operating performance measures (e.g., ROA, ROE, and NPM). CGI and 
controlling ownership are likely to be positively linked to firm valuation and operating 
performance. Following related literature (such as Black et al., 2006), several firm-
specific characteristics are included as control variables. Firm-specific control variables 
include, firm size (measured as the natural logarithm of assets), firm age (i.e., natural 
logarithm of the number of years since listing), growth potential of the firm (i.e., 3-year 
average asset growth), leverage (i.e., ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity3), 
investments (i.e., investment-to-net income), intangible assets (i.e., advertisement-to-
sales), and 4-digit industry dummies. Both firm size and firm age are expected to be 
negatively associated with financial performance measures. Growth potential, leverage, 
investment and intangible assets are expected to have positive associations with financial 
performance measures. We use Ordinary Least Square (OSL) estimation technique to 
estimate our model. 
 
A growing body of literature (see, Gompers et al., 2003; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) 
puts forward the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality with reference to the 
association between corporate governance and financial performance. Our single 
equation model cannot address these issues, primarily because of the absence of time 
variation in the governance and financial data, along with the problem of finding 
appropriate instrumental variables. This remains to be a caveat of the study with respect 
to the causal relation between corporate governance quality and financial performance. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of several firm-specific control variables and industry 
                                                 
3 The regression specifications of ROA, we use debt-to-asset ratio instead of debt-to-equity ratio. 
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dummies4 in the OLS model is likely to minimize omitted variable and optimal difference 
(Black et al., 2006) problems in the empirical estimation. Moreover, the robustness of the 
empirical effect of corporate governance is tested across sub-samples. As part of the 
robustness tests, a similar regression model is estimated by replacing the CGI with each 
of the three individual governance sub-indices, namely the shareholders’ rights, 
independence and responsibilities of the board and management, and financial reporting 
and disclosures. For diagnostics, Bera-Jarque (1981) test for normality of residuals and 
White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity are performed. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
This section explains the data including the CGI, followed by summary statistics and 
univariate analysis, and the regression results. 
 
4.1. The data 
 
This cross-sectional study is based on survey-based corporate governance data and 
published financial data. Amongst the 234 financial and non-financial listed firms of the 
prime exchange of the country that is The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), 140 firms 
responded to the survey5 (carried out by one of the authors in 2004), with the response 
rate being approximately 60%. The respondents of the questionnaire are the CEOs, 
company secretaries, executive board members, finance directors, chief accountants or 
other senior executives depending on the availability and accessibility. The responding 
firms capture nearly 86% of the total market capitalization (MC) of the DSE. The data on 
financial performance and other firm characteristics are collected from the annual reports 
of the sample firms for the latest financial year (2004-05) and the monthly reviews of the 
DSE.  
 
                                                 
4 Among others, Klapper and Love (2004) and Drobetz et al., (2004) argue that adding appropriate control 
variables can be one way to mitigate the omitted variable problems. 
5 Readers can obtain a copy of the survey instruments from the authors. 
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Corporate governance index: In order to measure corporate governance quality of the 
sample firms, a corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed, consisting of three 
individual governance components6 namely, the shareholders’ rights (sub-index 1), 
independence and responsibilities of the board and management (sub-index 2), and 
financial reporting and disclosures (sub-index 3). This paper follows several studies (e.g., 
Black et al., 2006 and Klapper and Love, 2004) in constructing a CGI, although many 
governance elements are modified in order to make the index compatible with the legal 
and regulatory issues in Bangladesh. The firm-specific scoring of the corporate 
governance practices in Bangladesh might not be comparable to international governance 
ratings. Given the persistent inefficiency in the legal and enforcement structures, this 
study is intended to measure the relative voluntary activism and/or legal compliance of 
the firm in corporate governance matters.  
 
The distribution of CGI scores of 140 listed firms in Bangladesh (shown in table 1) 
reveals that the mean (median) value of the CGI is 45.59 (46.50), and the standard 
deviation is 21.86. The standard deviation of the CGI is relatively higher, implying a high 
degree of deviation of the governance scores of many firms from the average governance 
index. This distribution is likely to be resulted from a widespread difference in 
governance qualities among the sample firms in various categories (e.g., foreign versus 
local).   
 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
 
Table 1 also shows the mean distribution of CGI and its sub-indices across various 
industrial categories. The overall governance quality of the foreign-controlled firms is 
found to be very high in relation to the locally-controlled firms, primarily because the 
former seems to follow internationally recognized best practices in many aspects of 
governance. In addition, controlling shareholders maintain roughly 50% ownership in the 
sample firms. Table 2 shows that all correlation coefficients amongst the CGI and its 
three sub-indices are positive, and all are statistically significant. 
                                                 
6 Further details of the construction of CGI are available upon request.  
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***Insert Table 2 about here***  
 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the univariate relationships between corporate governance indices and 
different financial performance variables.  
 
***Insert Table 3 about here***  
 
Following Gompers et al., (2003), we construct two extreme portfolios, namely, the 
‘repressive portfolio’ (i.e., firms with poor governance quality, with CGI < 41) and the 
‘moderate portfolio’ (i.e., better governed firms, with CGI > 53). Both portfolios 
represent the upper (45 firms) and lower (45 firms) third of the sample. The t-test results 
shown in Table 3 suggest that both market valuation and profitability of the moderate 
portfolio are higher than those of the repressive portfolio. Table 3 also shows that CGI, 
its three sub-indices and controlling ownership are positively correlated with all five 
financial performance measures. The univariate analysis appears to confirm our 
hypothesis in that firms with better governance quality have higher firm valuation as well 
as higher operating performance.           
 
4.3. The regression results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show OLS regression results of firm valuation and operating performance, 
respectively.  
 
***** Insert Table 4 about here***** 
 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the regression results of Tobin’s Q for the whole sample with 
the governance index (CGI) and controlling ownership as the main treatment variables, 
along with several other control variables including, firm size, firm age, growth, leverage, 
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investments, intangible assets, and industry dummies. It is revealed that the CGI, 
ownership and firm age have statistically significant positive associations with Tobin’s Q, 
whereas leverage shows a negative relationship with firm value. Column 2 shows 
identical results for the non-financial firms, although leverage turns out to be 
insignificant. Columns 3-4 show the regression results of similar specification with 
market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable. It is revealed that only CGI, controlling 
ownership and leverage give positive and statistically significant results.  
 
***** Insert Table 5 about here***** 
 
Table 5 shows similar specification results by replacing the valuation measures with three 
alternative measures of firm profitability such as, return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), and net profit margin (NPM). Overall, CGI as well as controlling 
ownership and other firm characteristics show statistically insignificant or inconclusive 
results in the regressions of ROA and ROE. However, CGI maintains statistically 
significant positive association with NPM.  
 
5. Analysis and interpretation of the results 
 
Overall, the regression results suggest that corporate governance quality is positively 
associated with a firm’s valuation, although the relationship between firm level corporate 
governance and operating performance seems inconclusive.  
 
5.1. Corporate governance and firm valuation 
 
The regression results show that the difference in a firm’s governance quality (e.g. CGI) 
can explain the variability in firm valuation (as measured by Tobin’s Q and market-to-
book ratio). The results also confirm the prediction of the agency theory that better firm-
level corporate governance enhances firm value. This study also finds controlling 
ownership being positively linked with firm valuation, which is consistent with the 
agency theory-based literature. The explanatory power of governance quality seems to 
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remain robust even after controlling for several firm characteristics such as, firm size, 
firm age, growth, leverage, investments, intangible assets, and industry dummies.  
 
This evidence corroborates with several notable studies (e.g., Morey et al., 2009; LLSV, 
2002; Gompers et al., 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005) that find better corporate 
governance having a positive effect on firm value. This result is also consistent with the 
empirical findings of other country-specific studies in Korea, (Black et al., 2006), India 
(Balasubramanian et al., 2010), Brazil (Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011), and Mexico 
(Price et al., 2011).  
 
The hypothesized positive association between corporate governance quality and firm 
valuation is also substantiated by positive relationships7 between individual governance 
elements (e.g., shareholder rights, responsibility and independence of the board and 
management, and transparency and disclosures) and valuation measures. Therefore, it is 
evident that better governance quality helps firms to enhance their market value through 
stronger shareholder rights, more responsible and independent behaviors of the board and 
management, and better financial reporting and disclosure practices.     
 
5.2. Corporate governance and operating performance 
 
Whilst our results show corporate governance quality (CGI) having a statistically 
significant positive association with net profit margin (NPM), and thus supports the 
evidence of Gompers et al., (2003), the relationship between CGI and firm profitability 
(e.g., ROA, ROE) seems inconsistent. Price et al., (2011) outline a number of reasons for 
such findings in the context of a developing economy. These include highly concentrated 
family ownership, lack of investor protection, high level of board interlocking and 
concerns about the true independence and monitoring by the board. They also argue that 
market monitoring mechanisms and mandatory requirement in governance related 
disclosures are not enough to create fundamental economic improvements. All of these 
                                                 
7 These results are not shown but are available upon request 
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factors seem to be plausible explanations for inconsistent empirical relationship between 
CG and operating performance in the context of Bangladesh.  
 
This study finds that controlling shareholders not only use their concentrated 
shareholding to exercise absolute control rights, but also ensure controlling shareholder-
aligned board and management to influence all corporate matters and boardroom politics. 
As Silva and Majluf (2008) argue, increased ownership concentration makes the 
expropriation more likely, because the controlling owners have enough control to run the 
firm in a less than optimal way and drive other private benefits outside the firm. We also 
find that the critical issue of board independence and transparency is also constrained by 
a high level of board interlocking, longer directorship tenure, and the dual role of the 
family-aligned CEOs. The direct or indirect interference of controlling shareholders in 
both financial and non-financial firms appears to have inhibited the development of 
corporate culture in relation to the independence and professionalism of the executive 
management. This powerful interest group appears to take full advantage of the country’s 
weak legal and regulatory structures through various forms of manipulation and 
expropriation.   
 
The evidence of a positive association between CG quality and firm valuation might also 
be resulted from increased investors’ confidence and their optimism about the firms’ 
future cash flows, a notion that is consistent with the signaling effect of CG (see also, 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009),. However, better governance practices of a limited 
number of foreign and locally-reputable firms might not be enough to mitigate 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation (agency) costs in the majority of the firms. 
Moreover, at the initial stage of CG reform in developing economies, the costs of 
implementing better governance standards are likely to be higher than the benefits of 
improved operating performance. As Doidge et al., (2007) observe, better governed firms 
in less-developed countries might find the benefit from good governance to be too small 
to justify the costs. All of these factors might have caused inconclusive evidence on the 
relationship between CG index and firm profitability. Claessens (2003) also argue that 
the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could 
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lead to a higher cost of capital and lower firm valuation, but not necessarily result in 
lower profitability. This is because firms in many weak corporate governance countries8 
not only deprive their shareholders of receiving fair dividends, but also manipulate the 
accounting profits.     
 
Similarly, Klapper and Love (2004) argue that firms can improve their investors’ 
protection to a certain degree, but this does not fully substitute for the absence of strong 
legal and enforcement structures. Silva and Majluf (2008) also argue that a more intense 
disciplinary role of the market forces the controlling shareholders to become more 
accountable to minority shareholders. Lu and Yao (2009) observe that an economy of 
financial repression needs to remove market and institutional rigidities that facilitate rent-
seeking behavior than to strengthen the legal system. Furthermore, Afsharipour (2009) 
observes that formal rules based on Anglo-American model will play an important role in 
the CG setting of an emerging economy, but reform cannot be widely instituted without 
proper enforcement institutions and widespread political support.  
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper investigated the effect of the firm-level corporate governance on market as 
well as accounting-based financial performance of a firm. This study finds that a group of 
foreign and locally-reputable firms not only comply with the existing out-of-date 
regulatory provisions, but also voluntarily adopt better governance practices. The 
evidence confirms the prediction of the agency theory in that corporate governance 
quality is positively associated with firm valuation. Given the poor state of capital market 
in Bangladesh, the results suggest that investors have confidence in better-governed 
firms, and that such firms are being properly rewarded by the market in terms of higher 
firm valuation. The estimation results of the governance sub-indices also suggest that 
higher controlling ownership, better outside shareholder rights, independent behavior of 
                                                 
8 For example, closely-held or insider-controlled firms in developing economies can exploit the lax 
corporate governance environment by depriving shareholders from getting dividends, manipulating 
accounting profits, or taking advantage of higher growth opportunities in the economy. 
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the board and management, and better disclosure standards tend to have positive 
influences on firm valuation.   
 
Notwithstanding the highly significant positive influence of corporate governance on firm 
valuation, the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance 
appears inconsistent. This is likely because the possibility of a considerable amount of 
agency costs associated with the controlling shareholders’ expropriation in the majority 
of local firms is less likely to be mitigated by the better governance practices of a limited 
number of reputable firms. The lack of investors’ awareness of corporate governance 
issues, together with the capital market-related malfunctions and the poor country-level 
governance has also played a part. Without eliminating these malfunctions, the effect of 
corporate governance reform on a firm’s overall performance, and thus on corporate 
sector development, is less likely to be fully materialized.  
 
In addition to its contribution to the existing literature, the evidence seems to have 
important policy implications in relation to the significance of both institutional and firm-
level corporate governance in developing economies. Whilst this study reveals a positive 
influence of the firm-level governance quality on firm value, it recognizes a strong 
governance role for the legal and enforcement structures to create a culture of compliance 
and to discipline the errant firms. This will enhance the process of creating and 
transferring economic value across various stakeholders of a firm. 
 
In this connection, this study suggests politically-motivated reform initiatives at both firm 
and institutional levels to remove governance malfunctions in the capital market as well 
as in firms, in order that the value of a firm is reflected in the share price. It is also 
important to develop close co-operation and co-ordination amongst the government and 
self-regulatory institutions to make sure that transparency and accountability are 
maintained and the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ rights are protected. This study 
also suggests a balance between voluntary adoption and mandatory compliance of 
governance practices. This will eventually encourage more foreign and local firms, 
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increase investors’ confidence, help investors and depositors to make ideal investment 
decisions, and maximize mutual benefits of the firm as well as the investors.  
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Table 1 
Mean values of corporate governance index across the sample firms 
Source: Prepared by one of the authors based on a questionnaire survey conducted in 2004.  
Sectors 
CG 
Index 
Shareholder 
Right 
Board & 
Management 
Disclosure 
Controlling 
Shareholding 
n 
Financial Sector 59.04 20.08 17.09 21.87 52.82 39 
Non-Financial Sector 40.40 15.62 10.03 14.74 49.15 101 
Foreign-Controlled 
Firms 
75.00 26.39 25.00 23.62 68.74 12 
Locally-Controlled 
Firms 
42.84 15.97 10.78 16.08 48.43 128 
Total 45.59 16.87 12.00 16.73 50.17 140 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix for corporate governance index and sub-indices 
Categories 
All Firms (n = 140) 
Non-Financial Firms 
(n = 101) 
CG 
Index 
(Sub-
index-1) 
(Sub-
index-2) 
CG 
Index 
(Sub-
index-1) 
(Sub-
index-2) 
Shareholder Rights  
(Sub-index-1) 
0.893*** 1  0.909*** 1  
Board 
(Sub-index-2) 0.821*** 0.600*** 1 0.808*** 0.628*** 1 
Disclosure 
(Sub-index-3) 0.880*** 0..722*** 0.630*** 0.868*** 0.742*** 0.565*** 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3 
Corporate governance and several firm characteristics 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Mean Ratios Correlation with CGI, Sub-indices and Ownership 
All REP. MOD. 
Difference 
(t-stat.) 
CGI Sub-1 Sub-2 Sub-3 
Sponsor 
Shareholding 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Q 1.36 0.92 1.82 -0.90*** 0.67*** 0.63** 0.53** 0.56*** 0.29*** 
MB 1.89 0.70 3.53 -2.82*** 0.73*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.23*** 
NPM 0.002 -0.22 0.12 -0.34*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.19** 
ROE 0.29 -0.01 0.83 -0.84* 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 0.33*** 
ROA -0.01 -0.11 0.06 -0.16** 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.32*** 0.49*** 0.18** 
AG 0.124 0.04 0.22 -0.18*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.21*** 
Lvg 4.95 2.66 8.71 -6.05*** 0.29*** 0.24** 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.23*** 
Size 13.70 12.80 14.74 -1.93*** 0.48*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.14* 
n 140 45 45  140 140 140 140 140 
 
Notes: The table is based on primary data on 140 listed firms (101 non-financial and 39 financial) in Bangladesh. Firms 
with the CGI of less than 41 are placed in the repressive portfolio (denoted as REP), whilst the moderate portfolio (e.g. 
MOD) consists of the firms with the CGI of greater than 53. Column 4 shows the difference (t-statistics) in the means 
of firm characteristics between the two portfolios. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
OLS regression results of Tobin’s Q and MKT2BK against the corporate governance 
index (CGI) 
Dep. Var. Q MKT2BK 
Expl. Var. 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 
0.282 
(0.561) 
0.005 
(0.690) 
0.619 
(1.496) 
-0.595 
(1.558) 
CGI 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
0.066*** 
(0.011) 
Sponsor shareholding 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
Intangible Assets 
0.497 
(0.550) 
0.338 
(0.604) 
2.148 
(1.468) 
1.966 
(1.364) 
Leverage  
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.136*** 
(0.012) 
0.141*** 
(0.027) 
Investment 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Growth 
0.149 
(0.170) 
0.047 
(0.200) 
0.767* 
(0.454) 
0.179 
(0.451) 
Size 
-0.038 
(0.043) 
-0.038 
(0.050) 
-0.138 
(0.114) 
-0.123 
(0.112) 
Age 
0.116** 
(0.056) 
0.145* 
(0.080) 
-0.285* 
(0.150) 
0.119 
(0.181) 
Ind. Dummies 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
F-statistics 8.97*** 9.06*** 15.39*** 7.320*** 
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.608 0.696 0.548 
N. of Obs. 138 99(NF) 136 97(NF) 
Normality [2(2)] 
 
4.09 4.06 5.65 4.97 
Heteroscedasticity [2(1)] 
 
2.99 3.56 1.99 2.34 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are 
the heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  
 
Table 5 
OLS regression results of ROA, ROE and NPM against the corporate governance index 
(CGI) 
Dep. Var. ROA ROE NPM 
Expl. Var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
0.050 
(0.313) 
0.163 
(0.428) 
-3.794** 
(1.636) 
-0.258 
(0.301) 
0.079 
(0.379) 
0.231 
(0.495) 
CGI 
8.84E-5 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Sponsor shareholding 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Intangible Assets 
0.138 
(0.316) 
0.154 
(0.377) 
-1.310 
(1.606) 
-0.025 
(0.246) 
0.176 
(0.372) 
0.120 
(0.433) 
Leverage  
-0.322*** 
(0.043) 
-0.329*** 
(0.054) 
0.142*** 
(0.013) 
-0.066*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Investment 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Growth 
-0.033 
(0.097) 
-0.070 
(0.124) 
0.585 
(0.496) 
0.103 
(0.087) 
0.228** 
(0.115) 
0.224 
(0.143) 
Size 
0.006 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
0.196 
(0.125) 
-0.003 
(0.022) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.042 
(0.036) 
Age 
0.005 
(0.032) 
0.014 
(0.050) 
-0.231 
(0.165) 
-0.013 
(0.035) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
0.011 
(0.057) 
Ind. Dummies 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
F-statistics 4.155*** 3.448*** 9.311*** 16.341*** 3.630*** 2.720*** 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.320 0.570 0.746 0.295 0.248 
N. of Obs. 138 99(NF) 136 97(NF) 137 96(NF) 
Normality [2(2)] 
 
4.16 0.57 4.96 2.23 4.67 5.54 
Heteroscedasticity 
[2(1)] 
 
3.48 5.20 0.04 1.03 0.67 0.05 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are 
the heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
